Многие слышали этот термин – теневая банковская система. Для себя сохраню популярное объяснение (на английском) что такое shadow banking system. 
Почему это важно сейчас? Потому что финансовая реформа еще не проведена. И чтобы ее провести, нужно знать, что пошло не так и что требуется исправить.

Наиболее интересный момент для меня в объяснении, как исправить ошибки теневой банковской системы, что профессор Mehrling вспоминает правило регулирования 1873 года. Со всеми своими инновациями современная финансовая система может регулироваться принципами 19-ого века!

Нет ничего нового, только повторение извечных циклов капитализма – "свободный рынок" терпит фиаско и сменятеся жестким реглированием, а потом опять восстанавливает свои права, отбирая у регулирования свои права и средства на пути к пику финансового пузыря и новому глобальному кризису.
 

Свой пузырь мы еще не сдули.

Слайды и объяснения Mike Konczal
http://rortybomb.wordpress.com/2010/02/05/a-roadmap-of-the-shadow-banks-plus-targeting-the-volcker-rule/

Презентация Raj Date
http://www.cambridgewinter.org/Cambridge_Winter/Archives/Entries/2010/1/27_THROUGH_THE_LOOKING_GLASS_(STEAGALL)_files/looking%20glass%20steagall%20012710_1.pdf


Интервью и объяснение  Perry Mehrling
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/07/shadow-banking-what-it-is-how-it-broke-and-how-to-fix-it/21038/

… The shadow banking system was built up alongside the traditional banking system, using some of these tools of modern finance we were just talking about like interest rate swaps and credit default swaps. The idea was to make credit cheaper for the ultimate borrower and more available, but also to separate the credit system from the payment system. A lot of the regulation we have on the traditional banking system is there to protect the payment system, to make sure that when you write a check on your deposit account, that money actually gets transferred.
The idea of the shadow banking system was in some way, not only tolerated by regulators, but encouraged by regulators. They thought, "Let’s get some of these risks off the balance sheet of the traditional banking system. Let’s get interest rate risk off the balance sheet of the traditional banking system. Let’s get credit risk off the balance sheet of the traditional banking system." They thought that would be a good thing. The traditional banks became an originator of loans which they packaged, securitized, and then sold to the shadow banking system, which then raised funds in the money market from mutual funds and asset-backed commercial paper that they issued to whomever. It was avoiding the traditional banking system entirely in this regard, and also avoiding all the regulation of the traditional banking system as well as all the regulatory support of the traditional banking system.
But of course it had the same risks. You aren’t actually getting rid of liquidity risk or getting rid of solvency risk; you are just moving them into a different place.

… The way this played out is the following. Once there is any concern about the value of the collateral you are putting up in an overnight borrowing situation, the first thing the lender does is to alter the deal, to say "Ok, we’ll continue to lend. But just to be on the safe side, instead of giving you 99 cents on the dollar we’ll give you 95 cents on the dollar." That immediately creates a problem for the shadow bank that is borrowing. Where are they going to get that other 4%? The way that plays out is that there is a downward spiral of the collateral because no one knew what these assets were really worth, so they looked to where these assets were traded. Where can we find a market price? And there was no market price.
So what they used as a proxy for a market price was the Asset Backed Securities (ABX) index, which was an index of 20 CDO tranches. This was a traded index. They looked at the price on this index as an indication of the value of the underlying. As that index fell the collateral value was marked down. You couldn’t borrow as much as you used to in order to carry the underlying security. This became a self-fulfilling prophesy on the way down, something I refer to as a "liquidity-solvency downward spiral."
I’ve told my students for a decade that this new system would inevitably get tested by a crisis. And when it got tested it was inevitable that it was going to break. We didn’t know where it was going to break, and the important thing now is to identify where it broke and to fix it so it doesn’t break there again.

And this is my argument, that this is really what happened, and why things became so brutal: That there was no organized lender of last resort for the shadow banking system. The shadow banking system really depended on the traditional banking system as its lender of last resort, and the traditional banking system depended on the Fed, but the Fed had no direct link.

… So what can the Federal Reserve do going forward to try and regulate this shadow banking system?

I use the term "Credit Insurer of Last Resort." And here’s the idea: The Bagehot Rule – lend freely, at a high rate, in a crisis – dates from 1873. That was a good enough rule for the 19th century British economy, an economy that ran on short term commercial bills of exchange, 90-day paper. You can see for the new capital markets banking system we have a problem. We have 30-year mortgages that are the underlying asset that are being turned into 90-day paper through asset-backed commercial paper, or a repurchasing agreement, or repo, but the underlying asset is still a 30-year mortgage. That is where the system broke, because those mortgages serve as collateral for the short term borrowing.
Floating the system with money market liquidity, which is what the Fed did, didn’t solve the problem, because it wasn’t getting to the capital markets. That’s why we need a credit insurer of last resort, to put a floor on the value of the best collateral in the system. I say the new Bagehot Rule should be: Insure freely but at a high premium.
Why a high premium? If you insure an earthquake, you are not making earthquakes more likely. The insurance contract is a purely derivative contract, it isn’t influencing earthquakes. That is not true of insurance of financial risk. When AIG is selling you systemic risk insurance for 15 basis points, that price is too low. People said: "If I can get rid of the whole tail risk that cheaply, I should load up. I should take more systemic risk." So the prices were wrong. So the important thing for government intervention here is to get that price closer to a reasonable rate to prevent people from creating earthquakes.

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